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1. Introduction 
In practice, the transformation process in post-communist countries covers all aspects 
of economic and social life, as well as economic policy. By its nature, it must also affect 
public finance and fiscal policy, and when the transformation process is initiated, the crisis 
in this latter sphere reflects _ often in a drastic manner _ the economic problems inherited 
from the previous economic system. These problems include macroeconomic imbalance, 
structural and price distortions, redundancy and ineffectiveness of social policy instruments 
and institutions as well as of public social services, over-regulation, paralysis of market 
adjustment mechanisms, and the dominance of state ownership. The crisis of public finance 
also frequently serves indirectly as an indicator of the extent to which the former political 
regime lost control over public finances and incomes policy (extreme cases of such loss of 
control include Poland in 1987-1989 and the USSR in 1990-1991). 
In the transition to a market economy, the state of public finances usually serves as an 
excellent litmus test of the progress achieved and the degree of internal consistency and far-
sightedness of the transformation policy. Simplifying somewhat, one can state that the share 
of public spending in gross domestic product (GDP), the degree of stability of public 
finances (including the budgets of territorial units and off-budget institutions), and the size 
of public debt constitute synthetic indicators of the quality of the transformation process and 
development perspectives in a given economy. 
The purpose of this study is to describe the separate stages of the transformation in 
light of the basic accompanying fiscal difficulties and to formulate general conclusions 
regarding the factors which substantially affect the state of public finances and the quality of 
fiscal policy in post-communist countries. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a synthetic classification of 
the post-communist economies according to their advancement in the transformation 
process; section 3 contains a proposed scheme for distinguishing successive stages of fiscal 
policy during the transformation period. In the following four sections, four such stages of 
fiscal policy are discussed. These are: initial destabilization, initial stabilization, secondary 
fiscal crisis, and finally, the restoration of fiscal potential. Section 8 is devoted to a group of 
countries which have not been able, so far, to achieve sustainable macroeconomic 
stabilization. Section 9 presents the issues concerning quasi-fiscal subsidies and the quasi-
fiscal deficit. Section 10 contains a summary and concluding remarks. 
The incompleteness and incomparability of statistical data is a major methodological 
difficulty in the examination of fiscal policy of the transformation period, and thus for the 
preparation of the present study. This incompleteness seems to be a quite obvious heritage 
of statistical practices applied under the previous political and economic system, when there 
was a tendency to hide various processes and phenomena from domestic and international 
public opinion for political or propaganda reasons (such sensitive topics included arms 
spending and the extent of social pathologies such as criminality and use of narcotics). 
Often, however, the lack of essential statistical information on the period before 
transformation and during its early stages was the effect of fossilized methodology, 
inadequate for current requirements and often resulting from ideological dogmatism (as in 
the case of the "stubborn" use in most post-communist countries of the net material product Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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index instead of GDP or GNP [gross national product] indices). Moreover, the fact that, 
until the end of the 1980s, most post-communist countries were not members of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) made it difficult for them to adapt domestic 
classification and budgetary reporting standards to international ones. The organizational 
and personnel weaknesses of the staffs compiling fiscal and monetary statistics are also still 
recognized as a negative factor (mainly in countries that have recently become 
independent). 
The moment the transformation process was launched, the restructuring of the state 
statistical system (including fiscal and monetary statistics) had to be begun. This process, 
however, proceeded gradually, which limits the comparability of statistical data from 
successive years. Comparison of data between countries is even more difficult, due to 
different dates at which the reform process was launched and different pace and consistency 
of methodological changes being implemented. Additional problems arise in relation to the 
countries that have achieved sovereignty as a result of the breakups of Yugoslavia, the 
Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Although even before the breakups, all these countries 
had separate republican budgets, a number of important fiscal functions were performed 
only at the federal level (particularly strong centralization and re-distribution characterized 
the USSR until 1990). 
All the aforementioned organizational and methodological issues limit significantly 
the ability to carry out intense quantitative and comparative research on the fiscal policy of 
the post-communist economies, even using databases of such experienced international 
organizations as the IMF or the World Bank. 
This paper was written on the basis of statistical data and information collected in the 
course of the research project "The Fiscal Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe under 
Transition," carried out by CASE (Center for Social and Economic Research) under the 
author’s supervision in 1994-1995 and sponsored by Ford Foundation, and information in 
the database of the World Bank EC 2 Department (Central Europe). The author was able to 
use the World Bank database during his tenure at the World Bank as a visiting research 
fellow from October 1994 to May 1995. Generally available IMF and World Bank 
publications were used as a supplementary source of information.
1 
 
2. The advancement of the post-communist economies in the 
transformation process. 
Before I proceed to fiscal policy analysis and its evolution, I would like to discuss 
briefly the degree of transformation process advancement in various groups of post-
communist countries. This categorization will be valuable in a later part of this paper to 
explain a difference between a basic scenario of fiscal adjustments and the individual 
                                              
1 The author is grateful to Marcin Łuczyński, Rafał Antczak and Michał Dąbrowski for their assistance in the 
preparation of some statistical tables used in the present study. M. Dąbrowski 
CASE Foundation  6
"specificity" of separate countries, and also to show distinctly where each country or group 
of countries finds itself on the fiscal transformation "map." 
My evaluation of the degree of transformation advancement in various countries is 
based on an interpretation (widely accepted in the literature on the subject) of the scope of 
transformation as including three basic processes. These are: (i) macroeconomic 
stabilization, (ii) liberalization and institutional changes, and (iii) privatization and 
restructuring (see Dąbrowski, 1995a). My proposed scheme for a transformation ranking of 
post-communist countries (as of autumn 1995)
2 is based on a qualitative analysis
3 of the 
following three factors: 
•  the degree of transformation process advancement in the three areas mentioned above 
(i.e., the extent to which a given country has adopted the standards in force in 
countries with stable market economies), 
•  the rapidity of change implementation, and 
•  the complexity and internal consistency of the reforms. 
 
As a result, we arrive at six country categories: 
1.  The former German Democratic Republic, which, beginning July 1, 1990, underwent 
almost immediate transformation based on the Agreement on Monetary, Economic and 
Social Union, supplemented by the Unification Treaty of October 1990. In practice, 
this case represented a total institutional "absorption" of the former GDR by the 
Federal Republic of Germany; 
2.  The first generation of rapid reformers (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Albania); 
3.  The second generation of rapid reformers (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Croatia, Macedonia); 
4.  The third generation of rapid reformers (Armenia, Kazakstan, Georgia); 
5.  Slow and inconsistent reformers (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine); 
                                              
2 In principle, this scheme constitutes an updated and modified version of a classification presented in an earlier 
paper (Dąbrowski, 1995a). 
3 Obviously, this type of analysis includes a number of subjective elements, which reflect the differences in the 
level of the author’s knowledge on the separate countries and his perception of the economic and political events that 
have occurred in those countries. Preparation of a more strictly quantitative ranking would require much more work 
and probably be beyond the author’s individual capabilities. Moreover, although all the attempts known to the author to 
prepare such a ranking based on a more formal quantitative analysis (see for example EBRD, 1994; de Melo, Denizer 
and Gelb, 1995) provide a generally correct picture, certain details are quite questionable with respect to both content 
and methodology. This is an example of undoubtedly greater precision not necessarily resulting in qualitatively superior 
synthetic results, mainly due to the fact that some important phenomena such as internal and external liberalization can 
be measured only with great difficulty or not at all. Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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6.  The remaining countries, which suffer from armed conflicts (New Yugoslavia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan) or have halted the reform process due to 
political reasons (Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan). 
 
3.  The fiscal scenarios of the transformation process 
It should be noted that not only the fiscal situation of the countries in transition from 
plan to market, but also the nature of the fiscal dilemmas they are experiencing, has changed 
dramatically. 
Seeking to capture, in an analytical way, the most critical issues and problems, one can 
"stylize" the following four-stage fiscal policy scenario which most of the countries that 
succeeded in completing the first transformation stage went through. 
1.  Macroeconomic destabilization (including fiscal destabilization) in the period directly 
preceding the launching of political and systemic transformation; 
2.  Initial macroeconomic stabilization connected with economic liberalization; 
3.  Secondary, post-stabilization fiscal crisis; 
4.  Restoration of fiscal potential connected with economic revival and advancement in 
the reforms of the public finance system. 
 
This "stylized" scenario is based mainly on the experience of the Polish economy, 
though a similar "route" of events can be also noticed in other countries which conducted 
the transformation process in a comprehensive and quick way (groups no. 1, 2 and 3 of the 
ranking presented above in Section 2). Such a scenario, however, is less observable in the 
case of the remaining categories, since the countries that initiated the program of radical 
reforms relatively late (group no. 4), at best can find themselves only at the second stage. In 
the countries that were gradually and inconsistently carrying out the reforms, an overlapping 
of the separate stages (mainly of first and third ones) ensued. At the same time the first stage 
turned out to be a long and very painful one in an economic and social sense. This specific 
case will be discussed separately later in this paper (see Section 8).It is most relevant to the 
remaining countries (group 6), a part of which are additionally burdened with war-effects 
and suffer from war damage. 
There are also countries that do not fall within the scope of the "stylized" scenario, or 
in which some scenario stages are vaguely outlined. For example, Czechoslovakia and to 
some extent Hungary "by-passed" the initial fiscal crisis, although the latter country suffers 
seriously from the secondary crisis (post-stabilization and post-liberalization one). The third 
stage, however, appeared to be relatively mild in the Czech Republic and Estonia. These 
and other exceptions will be discussed more extensively later. 
 M. Dąbrowski 
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4.  Initial destabilization stage 
The post-communist countries have inherited from the previous system a number of 
serious economic problems. These are the most serious ones: 
1.  Full or almost full nationalization, which "squeezed" individual savings and directly or 
indirectly limited private economic activity. The natural consequence was the practice 
of financing investment mainly from budgetary and quasi-budgetary resources (off-
budget funds, funds collected by bodies such as associations of enterprises, targeted 
central bank credits), and only secondarily from profits of enterprises and private 
savings collected by the state savings bank and redistributed through the banking 
system for development processes steered by the state. 
2.  The existence of huge structural distortions resulting from creation of strong 
monopolistic structures, autarkic trade policy, administrative regulation of prices and 
centralized investment decisions. Under the CMEA regime, Central and East European 
economies as well as the USSR were strongly oriented toward domestic and regional 
markets. The currency inconvertibility, state price control, trade restriction and state 
monopoly in foreign trade _ all these factors led, more or less, to the isolation of those 
economies from the international market. 
3.  Substantial social obligations of the state in comparison with the economic 
development level reached by those countries (Sachs, 1995a). 
4.  Permanent internal and external macroeconomic imbalance, severely felt mainly in the 
last phase of the former system’s existence. 
 
With regard to the subject-matter of the present study, the most important is the last of 
the problems listed above, in particular fiscal imbalance, which constituted a main reason 
for monetary imbalance (since the fiscal or quasi-fiscal deficit was financed by monetary 
emission). This led, in turn, to inflationary pressure, either in a hidden (shortage of goods) 
or open form (price increase). Foreign credits appeared to be an alternative method of 
financing the actual deficit of public sector. In the case of most East European countries 
(Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and at the end of the 1980, the USSR), this led to 
enormous external indebtedness.
4 
Passing on to the analysis of the sources of fiscal imbalance, two groups of factors can 
be theoretically distinguished. The first group consists of those which were permanently 
effective through the whole period of planned economy, and the second of those that 
emerged during the last phase of that system; i.e., during its accelerated collapse. In 
practice, however, an attempt to draw a distinctive boundary-line between both kinds of 
reasons may raise some doubts. 
                                              
4 In the case of German Democratic Republic, different types of non-repayable transfers from the Federal 
Republic of Germany were also involved. Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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If we look at the list of major economic problems inherited from the centrally planned 
economy, we can without any hesitation point to items 2 and 3 as the sources of permanent 
fiscal tensions. More detailed historical analysis reveals, however, some differences. 
Whereas structural disproportions were rooted in early stages of socialist industrialization 
programs, central allocation of resources, administrative prices and state monopoly in 
foreign trade (in the USSR since the abandonment of the New Economic Policy at the end 
of the 1920s, and in Eastern Europe since the end of the 1940s), the social part of the 
heritage of the previous system is of more recent origin. 
A restrictive welfare spending policy was characteristic for first decades of the 
communist regime. The situation started gradually changing only after Stalin’s death, along 
with growing social dissatisfaction (bloody events in German Democratic Republic in 1953, 
in Poland in 1956 and 1970, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968). Post-Stalinist 
communist leaders (Khrushchev and Brezhnev in the USSR, Kadar in Hungary, Ulbricht 
and Honecker in GDR, Husak in Czechoslovakia, Gierek and Jaruzelski in Poland) began to 
try to attract social support for their governments. The biggest jump in social welfare 
spending was recorded towards the close of communist regimes’ existence, when the 
process of seeking social approval became more intense. It was often connected with partial 
democratization of the system, and with the efforts of the hitherto existing government elites 
to gain the electorate’s approval. 
On the other hand, a substantial part of the democratic opposition, while criticizing the 
ineffectiveness and inhumanity of the planned economy, was not fully aware of the scale of 
macroeconomic crisis in their countries, and sometimes did not understand the basic 
principles of the market economy at all. The struggle against the communist regime was, for 
them, a struggle for an improvement of living standards, higher wages and increases in 
social welfare spending. In a systemic sense, they were seeking the so-called "third way". 
That was true in the case of the Solidarity trade union in Poland (which was demonstrated 
during the "Round Table" meetings in early 1989 and the election campaign of June 1989), 
the "Podkrepa" Trade Union in Bulgaria, the "Democratic Russia" movement, the "Sajudis" 
movement in Lithuania, and the Ukrainian democratic pro-independence opposition. 
The most spectacular explosion of welfare spending and wages occurred in Poland in 
1987-1989 and in the USSR. 
The scale of state social spending has always been a feature differentiating Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR from communist countries in Asia. The latter countries have 
provided much more modest social nets than those in Central and East European countries 
and the former USSR (Sachs, 1995a). Thanks to this they were able to maintain 
macroeconomic discipline at a fairly high level (although Vietnam was forced to conduct a 
radical stabilization operation in early 1989). 
The explosion of social spending towards the close of communist regime was not the 
only reason for fiscal crisis and growing inflationary tensions. The state de facto lost control 
over state enterprises and their finances (especially wages). 
The first historical reason for this loss of control and consequently for the emergence 
of fiscal tensions was the incompleteness of economic reforms that dismantled, to some M. Dąbrowski 
CASE Foundation  10
extent, traditional system of central planning, offering no alternative solution in exchange. 
Several decades of experience of reforming the socialist economy (beginning with the early 
stages of self-government reform in Yugoslavia in 1950) have clearly shown that "market 
socialism" or other variants of the "third way" are difficult to reach, and at the same time 
lead to serious macroeconomic disequilibrium problems. It is no accident that Yugoslavia 
and Poland were the leaders in macroeconomic instability among the socialist countries, and 
that the first destabilization phase in the USSR (under Gorbachev’s "perestroika") was 
connected with partial enlargement of state enterprise autonomy. Of all the reforming 
countries, only Hungary succeeded in avoiding serious crisis, although this economy cannot 
be considered a model of stability (especially if the scale of external indebtedness is taken 
into account). 
The problem of the detailed mechanisms leading to fiscal destabilization under partial 
liberalization of the command economy is discussed in economic literature. Generally, the 
loss of traditional budgetary or quasi-budgetary revenues obtained primarily through the 
state’s confiscation of almost all enterprise profits in classic socialist economies is 
emphasized. As the financial autonomy of enterprises increases, the budget loses part of 
these revenues. If, in the meantime, the state does not create alternative ways of collecting 
money from enterprises and citizens (through an obligatory system of direct and indirect 
taxes) or reduce its expenditures, then the budget deficit grows (McKinnon, 1992). This is 
not, however, the only mechanism. The description of the adverse influence of incomplete 
reforms on fiscal equilibrium can be extended through incorporating a few additional 
factors and phenomena in the analysis. 
The growth of state enterprise autonomy in wage determination (indispensable for 
creation of a more aggressive system of financial incentives for employees and 
management), coupled with a lack of adequate interest in profit
5, leads to a decline in profit, 
and thus to a drop in budgetary revenues. Additionally, the level of wages paid in the 
enterprises indirectly affects _ through informal and formal "indexation" systems _ the level 
of wages in the government sector, pensions, and other social contributions financed out of 
the budget or from off-budget funds. 
 Even more harmful is a gradual and selective price liberalization, which leads to 
growing gaps between market prices and administratively determined or regulated prices, 
where subsidies, tax concessions, or other forms of financial compensation for producers are 
necessary. Since the goods and services sold at controlled prices _ due to their great political 
sensitivity _ cover generally a large group of products with a large share in overall market 
turnover, the final consequence of gradual price liberalization is an increase in budgetary 
subsidies and a decline in budgetary revenues resulting from the application of tax 
concessions or a general drop in profitability. 
In the light of existing empirical experience, gradual and poorly coordinated price 
liberalization which is subject to public political bargaining constitutes the major threat to 
macroeconomic stability at the end of the command system. In addition to the earlier 
                                              
5 There is a large literature on the objective functions of different forms of non-private enterprises. A summary 
of the discussion on this subject is contained in Dąbrowski (1990). Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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discussed negative influence on budget equilibrium, one should also focus on the increase in 
velocity of money circulation caused by the expectations about the inflation rate 
(inflationary expectations) resulting from slow price deregulation. This problem was 
severely felt in Poland in 1987-1989 and in the USSR in 1989-1991 (see table 1), where 
either the problem of price liberalization or administrative adjustment of prices to 
equilibrium levels was a subject of public discussion, and the final political decisions in that 
matter were delayed for many months. To a lesser extent this process could also be observed 
in other countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (in the second half of 1990 while 
waiting for price liberalization that was to become effective January 1, 1991), and the 
former GDR (the day before the monetary, economic and social union that was 
implemented July 1, 1990). 
Price deregulation was usually connected with elimination of product rationing and 
liberalization of product markets and enterprise finances. In some countries (Poland, the 
former USSR, Romania) the liberalization of domestic trade affected both consumer and 
producer markets, while in the remaining countries it was mainly related to the latter one. 
All those movements were conducive to a one-time increase in money velocity. 
The destabilizing influence of gradual and inconsistent reforms in the late stage of 
socialism was additionally strengthened due to the weakness, and sometimes disintegration, 
of the socialist state. This mechanism has been described in greater detail in the discussion 
of the explosion of welfare spending and wages.  
The most dreadful symptoms of breakdown of public finance due to disintegration of 
the communist political system could be observed towards the close of the USSR’s 
existence. 
A substantial relaxation of macro- and micro-economic discipline and unfavorable 
changes in terms of trade in the first period of "perestroika" (the latter mainly related to a 
drop in oil prices on the world markets) were intensified by the effects of political 
competition between Yeltsin and Gorbachev and between the Russian Federation and Soviet 
institutions. At the end of 1990, the newly established Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation began taking over regional units of the USSR State Bank (Gosbank) and 
conducting an independent monetary policy (consisting mainly in crediting the republican 
budget deficit and enterprises). At the same time, the government of the Russian Federation 
was competing with the government of the Soviet Union for the supervision over state 
enterprises by offering them lower tax rates. Russia, moreover, refused to remit the taxes 
collected on its territory to the Union budget, with the exception of a certain sum 
unilaterally fixed by Russia. 
The further development of political and economic events in 1991 led to the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and hidden hyperinflation at the end of 1991. The hidden hyperinflation 
consisted mainly in a complete lack of goods in the stores, while the price control over the 
majority of basic products and services was formally maintained. 
In 1987-1989 in Poland (see above), in 1990 in Romania (after the fall of Ceausescu’s 
dictatorship), in 1989-1990 in Bulgaria and in 1990-1992 in Albania, a similar collapse of 
public finances occurred, though less drastic than that in the USSR. M. Dąbrowski 
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The political disintegration of Yugoslavia followed a dramatic course too. At the end 
of 1989 and at the outset of 1990, in a country that had been suffering for twenty years form 
chronically high inflation, an effective anti-inflation program _ connected with the name of 
Prime Minister Ante Markovic _ was finally implemented. The duration of Yugoslav 
stabilization, however, turned out to be very short due to growing political disintegration. In 
the second half of 1990 and the first three quarters of 1991 the federal government and 
National Bank of Yugoslavia lost control over fiscal and monetary policies of the separate 
republics, which led to backsliding into high inflation. The ongoing civil war (lasting in the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina until the end of 1995) appeared to be another destabilizing 
factor. Of the post-Yugoslav countries, only Slovenia quickly managed to revive 
stabilization at the end of 1991 (see the following section), whereas it took Croatia and 
Macedonia three years to do so (although with a very positive final effect). At the end of 
1993, New Yugoslavia (i.e., the federation of Serbia and Montenegro) fell into one of the 
most spectacular hyperinflations in the economic history of the world (Rostowski, 1995). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are confronted with the very difficult tasks of post-war rebuilding 
and stabilization. 
Only Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR avoided serious fiscal crisis at the 
beginning of transformation period; however, in these countries the macroeconomic 
stabilization level was far from Western standards. In the case of Czechoslovakia and the 
former GDR, the maintenance of an unreformed command system and then its quick 
replacement with market regulation mechanisms proved to be of the greatest importance. 
Both countries were characterized by a high level of political and economic discipline 
during the central planning era, and state authority and control over the economy did not 
undergo spontaneous disintegration, as was more or less the case in the remaining countries.  
Hungary’s success in avoiding political and economic disintegration has occurred 
despite the completely different initial situation of this country from that in Czechoslovakia 
and the GDR. In the 1980s, Hungary was the leader in political and economic freedom in 
the communist camp. The decentralized version of the planned economy existing in 
Hungary, although not free of some of the weak points observed in Yugoslavia and Poland, 
remained capable of subjecting economic entities to elementary microeconomic and fiscal 
discipline. The last communist government of Karoly Nemeth, with a clear pro-reform 
attitude, was also able to avoid the blatantly populist decisions that destabilize public 
finances. 
Table 2 presents basic indicators reflecting the fiscal situations of six former members 
of the CMEA in the year preceding the launching of the fundamental transformation 
process. It should be emphasized, however, that this data is only approximate, due to the 
aforementioned incomparability of statistical data between these countries. A quasi-fiscal 
deficit (usually connected with central bank operations or foreign credits) not included in 
official budgetary statistics constitutes another factor distorting the picture. I will 
concentrate on this problem in Section 9 of this paper. 
Data contained in table 2 confirm the dramatic state of public finances in the USSR 
before its breakup (1991), and also the relatively high deficit of general government in 
Poland in 1989. In the case of Poland, the general indicator for 1989 "hides" substantially 
deeper crises of public finances in the second and third quarter of 1989 (in the fourth quarter Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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of 1989 the process of withdrawing subsidies was started, and the budget was almost 
balanced for the quarter). In all countries, there were also quasi-fiscal expenditures of the 
central bank. 
Some comments on Romania are in order, as this country showed a significant budget 
surplus. In the second half of the 1980s, Romania was realizing a restrictive program aimed 
at external debt repayment (debt of the 1970s). This policy, accompanied by strict economic 
and political restrictions, was one of the factors that led to the uprising against Ceausescu’s 
regime in December 1989. 
 
5.  Initial stabilization stage 
The experience of approximately 30 countries undergoing the transition process from 
plan to market reveals that macroeconomic stabilization is a necessary (however 
insufficient) condition for achieving progress in other areas of transformation (see 
Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1994; Balcerowicz, 1994; de Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1995). Since 
a considerable fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit constitutes a main source of macroeconomic 
instability at the very beginning of transformation, anti-inflation activities, in order to be 
effective, have to be directed to the elimination or reduction of that deficit. The "standard" 
set of measures for doing so includes: 
1)  elimination or substantial cut in consumer and producer subsidies, 
2)  cutback of other government expenditures (mainly investment expenditures and 
defense spending), 
3)  reduction of tax concessions and increase in tax rates or introduction of additional 
emergency taxes if necessary, 
4)  elimination of central bank quasi-fiscal spending (mainly in form of negative real 
interest rates, differentiated exchange rates and credits directed to particular sectors of 
the economy). 
 
The activities listed in items 1, 3 and 4 are impossible without price liberalization 
carried out on a wide scale. This price liberalization, in turn (under the conditions of 
extensive monopolization prevailing in most of the post-communist economies at the 
beginning of transformation), requires external liberalization of economy. 
As the criterion for initial stabilization stage success, I suggest adopting a sustained 
(i.e., minimum of two successive years) fall in inflation below the level of 50% per annum 
concurrently with free formation of most prices, eliminating the so-called monetary 
overhang characteristic for Kornai’s economics of shortage (Kornai, 1980). Obviously, the M. Dąbrowski 
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level of 50% inflation is purely arbitrary, but it seems to be a reasonable threshold of 
elementary stability of prices following their general liberalization.
6 
Table 3 presents a picture of the success achieved in the field of macroeconomic 
stabilization among the post-communist countries that is approximately mirrored by the 
average yearly data, which with some lag respond to current (December-to-December) 
inflation rates. A certain complication results from the fact that in some cases the anti-
inflation policy is applied in the second half of the calendar year. The statistical effect _ in 
the form of a drop in the average annual inflation rate _ is visible only in the following year 
or even two years later. 
In spite of these methodological reservations, the criterion of macroeconomic stability 
defined above can be said to be met, before the end of 1995, by the following eight 
countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Albania, Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia. If we include the current indicators (from December to December), we should also 
include Croatia, Macedonia and Lithuania. The aforementioned criterion seems to be almost 
satisfied by Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Romania. Considering current monthly inflation rates 
in post-Soviet countries for the period of July 1994-August 1995 (see table 4), Armenia, 
Georgia and Kazakstan could (in 1996-1997) join the group of countries that have reached a 
fundamental level of stabilization. 
This ranking of countries according to the degree of stability achieved corresponds, in 
general, with the classification _ contained in Section 2 _ according to the degree of 
transformation process advancement. 
Table 5 shows budgetary revenues, expenditures and balance (in % of GDP) in 29 
post-communist countries in 1989-1994. In the case of many countries (mainly the former 
USSR and Yugoslavia successors), however, a full time-set of data is not in my possession. 
In spite of this incompleteness, it is obvious that most countries that succeeded in achieving 
fundamental macroeconomic stability (i.e., inflation below 50% per annum) enjoy relatively 
low budget deficits. Only 3 out of 11 countries included in this group have deficits 
exceeding 3% of GDP. These were Albania, Hungary and Lithuania. In 1994 Lithuania was 
only beginning the stabilization process, and according to prognoses its fiscal balance for 
1995 should be much better. Albania has received much non-repayable foreign assistance 
and concessionary loans granted by the IMF and the World Bank. Hungary, as mentioned 
earlier, has never gone through pre-transformation destabilization, and thus did not have to 
introduce strict stabilization measures. All adjustment activities related to budgetary 
expenditures in 1991-1993 turned out, however, to be insufficient. That is why Hungary is 
the country that suffers most severely from the so-called secondary fiscal crisis (see the 
following section). In reality, Hungary is also the only country that will register an increase 
in inflation in 1995. Due to falling confidence in the Hungarian economy, the possibilities 
for external financing of the budget deficit through placing government bonds on western 
financial markets are limited. 
                                              
6 A similar criterion has been adopted by Anders Aslund (1994). Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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The 11 countries mentioned above differ from each other in the scale and detailed path 
of fiscal adjustments. Due to lack of comprehensive data and the peculiar situation of 
"newly" independent countries of the former USSR and Yugoslavia (assumption of 
functions performed earlier by the federal authorities), table 6 contains data regarding only 
five East and Central European countries. Although Bulgaria initially adopted a very 
ambitious program of liberalization and stabilization, which peaked in 1991, the 
government later suspended this program; thus, inflation never fell below 50% per annum, 
and what is more, in the winter of 1993-1994 a noticeable macroeconomic destabilization 
was recorded (see next section). Nevertheless, it seems to be reasonable to include Bulgaria 
in the analysis due to its typical (for strongly centralized economies) path of fiscal 
adjustment for the first years of the transformation process. 
Analyzing table 6, two paths for adjustment processes immediately after initiation of 
the transformation process can be distinguished. The first one is represented by 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Albania, whose economies were strongly centralized before 
the beginning of the transformation process and resembled the model command system. In 
1989, these 3 countries registered a high share of budgetary expenditures in GDP (from 
approximately 58% of GDP in Albania up to 72.3% in Czechoslovakia). In addition, a 
significant decline both in expenditures and revenues was recorded. In Czechoslovakia, 
however, the fall in expenditures and revenues was uniform, which allowed for maintenance 
of a reasonable budget deficit. In Bulgaria and Albania, the decline in revenues significantly 
exceeded the decrease in expenditures; thus, the budget deficit increased. In both countries, 
fall in real GDP was much stronger than in Czechoslovakia (see table 7) which in fact 
meant a more dramatic decrease in real expenditures, and an even more substantial drop in 
real revenues. 
Whereas in Czechoslovakia the decline in the share of budgetary expenditures and 
revenues in GDP was the effect of a conscious and tightly controlled government policy of 
liberalization and comprehensive restructuring of the economic system, in Albania and 
Bulgaria, in addition to the aforementioned processes, there are also other factors such as 
significant weakening of fiscal administration and loss of government control over the 
enterprise sector. 
In 1989, Hungary and Poland entered a stage of fundamental transformation of the 
political system. The economic systems of those countries were much more decentralized, 
and the scope of administered prices and subsidies as well as price disproportions was 
smaller. The Hungarian economy was "more market-oriented" and better balanced in fiscal 
and monetary respects than the Polish economy (see Section 4). In 1988-1989, Poland 
experienced a substantial drop in the share of revenues in GDP and a slight fall in the share 
of expenditures in GDP (Bratkowski, 1993; Bratkowski et al., 1995). In 1989, at the starting 
point, Hungary had a much higher share of expenditures of general government (61% of 
GDP) than Poland (48.9%), which resembles the situation typical for the countries with a 
highly centralized version of the planned economy (see above). In 1989, the share of 
subsidies in Hungarian GDP (12.1%) was, however, lower than the Polish share (12.9%), 
not to mention the Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian shares (15.5% and 25% respectively). In 
1989, in comparison with Polish budget, the Hungarian budget had a higher share of the 
following expenditures:  M. Dąbrowski 
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•  goods and services expenditures (20.5% of GDP in Hungary and 10.2% of GDP in 
Poland), 
•  debt service expenditures (2.4% and 0%, respectively), 
•  social security benefits expenditures (14.4% and 11.2%, respectively), 
•  capital expenditures (6.6% and 3.3%). 
 
It is worth stressing that a lower initial share of subsidies in GDP, and in the case of 
Poland, a lower share of budgetary expenditures and revenues in GDP as well, resulted in 
the fact that both countries (Hungary and Poland) followed a less strict "adjustment path" in 
the field of fiscal policy than Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Albania. In 1989-1990, as far as 
Hungary is concerned, the adjustment path consisted in relatively slight cuts both in the 
expenditures of the extended governmental sector (by 3.5% of GDP) and the revenues (by 
1.6% of GDP). Consequently, Hungary went from a slight deficit of general government     
(-1.4% of GDP in 1989) to a negligible surplus (+0.5% of GDP). 
Poland where in 1989 the deficit of general government amounted to 7.5% of GDP) 
was on the edge of hyperinflation in second half of 1989. Therefore, Poland had to make 
deeper and more asymmetric adjustments than Hungary, lowering expenditures by 9.1% of 
GDP in 1990 (at the same time, there was a substantial fall in GDP) and increasing revenues 
by 1.4% of GDP. As a result, in 1989, a surplus of general government amounting to 3.0% 
of GDP was achieved. 
The given data allow us to examine only two items on the expenditure side; i.e., 
subsidies (see table 8) and capital expenditures (see table 9), which make up a standard 
adjustment package for the first transformation stage.  
The most significant reduction of subsidies was made by Czechoslovakia (by 20% of 
GDP in 1989-1992) _ the country that had also had the highest starting level (25% of GDP). 
Czechoslovakia was followed by Albania (reduction by 18.1% of GDP in 1991-1993, with a 
starting level of 20.3% in 1991), Bulgaria (13.7% of GDP in 1989-1992, although in 1993 
an increase of 3% of GDP was registered), Poland (10.7% of GDP in 1989-1993) and 
Hungary (7.3% of GDP within the same period).
7 It is worth repeating that the drop in 
subsidies was accompanied by a slump in GDP, therefore the decrease in overall real 
subsidies was even greater than the fall in their share in GDP. In 1993, the level of subsidies 
in Poland and Albania amounted to 2.2% of GDP, while in Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, they amounted to 4-5% of GDP. 
                                              
7 It is worth emphasizing that both Hungary and Poland reduced the share of subsidies in GDP in the preceding 
years due to partial price liberalization. In Poland, a substantial cut in subsidies was indicated in second half of 1989 
after food price liberalization. In 1988-1989, a fall in capital expenditures of the extended governmental sector was also 
registered (Bratkowski et al., 1995). Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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As far as capital expenditures are concerned, there is no uniform trend. Albania, with a 
record level in 1989 (29.3% of GDP), had by 1992 made the greatest relative reduction in 
these expenditures, which were down to 4.3% of GDP. In 1993, however, they increased to 
7.7% of GDP. Bulgaria and Poland, beginning from a much lower level (5.5% and 3.3% of 
GDP respectively, in 1989), recorded a steady decline in capital expenditures (in Bulgaria, 
there was a temporary increase in 1992), while adopting a "milder" trajectory than 
Albania’s. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, after a temporary and slight drop in 1990, the 
share of capital expenditures in GDP increased over the following years.  
The available statistics on budgetary revenues render impossible a detailed evaluation 
of the fiscal results of suspending tax concessions, unifying turnover tax rates, lowering 
marginal income tax rates (especially for the private sector) and other reformatory activities. 
In the first period of transformation, a generally observed fall in the share of budgetary 
revenues in GDP resulted from lowering the highest turnover tax rates (elimination of price 
disproportions) and income tax rates, as well as from eliminating the so-called "duplication 
effect" (Barbone and Marchetti, 1995); i.e., taxation of profits generated by subsidies. 
 
6.  Secondary fiscal crisis stage 
The improvement of the fiscal balance resulting from radical adjustment activities at 
the very beginning of transformation process has not turned out to be lasting. A majority of 
the post-communist countries that succeeded in the second stage experienced secondary 
(post-stabilization) fiscal crisis shortly thereafter. Only the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Estonia have managed to avoid serious problems connected with balancing the budget. I 
will describe the situation of those countries in a further part of the present section. 
The most important concrete reasons for the secondary fiscal crisis are the fall in 
budgetary revenues (particularly revenues derived from enterprise income tax) and the 
increase in welfare spending. 
Table 10 presents a scale of changes in the ratio of budgetary revenues to GDP in 
1989-1994. Twenty of the 26 countries included in table 10 registered a drop in budgetary 
revenues, at times very noticeable. Five of the six countries that recorded an increase in 
ratio of revenues to GDP have recently become independent. Those countries have taken 
over rights to certain revenue sources held earlier exclusively at the union level. 
Additionally, two of them (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan) have crude oil pools and other raw 
materials that can be easily exported. In 1989, the level of revenues in Poland was 
exceptionally low due to dramatic collapse of public finance system and hyperinflation 
effects (Oliviera-Tanzi effect). This was probably also the case for three former Yugoslav 
republics _ Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. 
 The picture contained in Table 10 is incomplete, since the figures referring to an 
increase in revenues are of aggregated character and relate to the whole five-year period, in 
which different stages of fiscal policy overlap for different countries. It is worth noticing 
that 1989 was for most countries (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, the USSR) 
a year of "normal" planned economy (although in many cases it was the last year). In M. Dąbrowski 
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Hungary, the processes of liberalization, removal of subsidies and reform of the tax system 
were already advanced. A similar situation existed in Poland, which had entered the initial 
stage of fiscal crisis. High inflation was also raging in Yugoslavia.  
An even less comparable year is 1994, since some of the countries were still in the 
stage of initial fiscal crisis, others were only at the end of the stabilization phase, still others 
were at different stages of secondary fiscal crisis, and a small number of countries were 
emerging from crisis. The aggregation of the data makes it impossible to differentiate 
revenue drops resulting from price liberalization and removal of price disproportions from 
those resulting from decrease in the fiscal effectiveness of the state. Therefore, in order to 
illustrate the symptoms of fiscal crisis more precisely, one should refer to more 
disaggregated data related both to the revenue and expenditure items of key importance for 
this stage. 
Both the sources and the course of the secondary fiscal crisis can be best identified 
based on the examples of East and Central European countries, although the crisis 
symptoms (particularly, a drop in revenues derived from enterprise income tax) can also be 
noted in most countries of the former USSR _ even in countries such as Russia _ where 
there is still three-digit annual inflation, which means that they have not brought the initial 
stabilization process to an end (see Section 8). 
Table 11 shows the revenue from taxes on enterprise profits. In all countries, a drop in 
receipts derived from the aforementioned source can be observed. Czechoslovakia 
constitutes an exception (until 1992, an exceptionally high level of proceeds from the 
above-mentioned source were maintained
8), as do Albania and the post-Yugoslav countries, 
where this tax was always of minor importance. A rapid drop in average enterprise 
profitability is the basic reason
9. Some reasons for that drop include: 
•  withdrawal of direct and indirect subsidies (in the form of real interest rate credits) and 
elimination of the "duplication effect" related to them, 
•  increase in domestic and external competition, and thus reduction of monopolistic 
profits: many enterprises are affected by deep financial crisis due to difficulties in 
selling current production, 
•  weakening of state enterprise motivation to gain profits due to a temporary systemic 
and ownership vacuum, 
                                              
8 In 1993, both the Czech and Slovak Republics registered a falling tendency, but this may partially result from a 
drop in enterprise income tax rates (see Stepanek et al.,1995; Adamec, 1995). 
9 In a few cases, a reduction of tax rates and increase in the range of tax exemptions have played a certain role. 
The tax exemptions, however, have a bigger influence on diminishing the effective tax rates in those post-communist 
countries where financial discipline has been considerably weakened (Ukraine or Russia), and which are not included 
in Table 11.  Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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•  tendency to hide profits both in the private and state sectors in order to diminish tax 
obligations (in a part of the state sector, this may be additionally connected with a pre-
privatization tactics), 
•  fall in the inflation rate and elimination of so-called paper profits resulting from high 
inflation. 
 
The last element seems to play a key role in all countries which were overcoming high 
or very high inflation. The large share of tax proceeds in GDP in Poland in 1990, and then 
its rapid decrease (in spite of the fact that effective tax rates remained unchanged) can serve 
as an example. 
In most countries, a drop in relative proceeds from enterprise profit taxes was partially 
compensated by increases in personal income taxes (this includes taxes on profits derived 
from economic activity conducted by physical persons). This effect was particularly 
dramatic in Poland, where, in 1992, with the introduction of the Personal Income Tax Act, a 
jump in budgetary proceeds from this tax was registered (from 2.4% of GDP in 1991 to 
6.3% of GDP the next year). 
In contrast to corporate income tax, the proceeds from turnover taxes, VAT and excise 
taxes either did not fall in relation to GDP (except for an initial period of price deregulation 
in several countries), or decreased on a smaller scale. The Central European countries that 
replaced the traditional turnover tax with VAT (Hungary in 1988, Slovenia and Croatia in 
the 1990s, the Czech and Slovak Republics at the beginning of 1993, Poland in the second 
half of 1993) show a higher level of indirect tax proceeds than those countries that did not 
introduce any reforms; in addition, proceeds began to grow immediately when the reforms 
were implemented. This proves the higher tax efficiency of the VAT in comparison with the 
traditional turnover tax. 
The introduction of the VAT (NDS _ nalog s dobavlennoi stoimosti) in the countries 
of the former USSR (at the beginning of 1992) resulted in much worse fiscal performance. 
Apart from the generally lower efficiency of tax administration and the weaker financial 
discipline of the enterprises, the numerous constructional defects of the post-Soviet NDS 
seem to play a substantial role. 
So far we analyzed the share of various taxes in officially registered GDP. An 
additional dramatic aspect of the situation has consisted in the slump in GDP in all post-
communist countries at the discussed stage of the transformation process. In reality, 
therefore, these countries were faced not only with substantial declines in the share of 
budgetary revenues in GDP, but also with an even greater decline in overall real revenues. 
The proceeds from most sources are correlated with GDP value, while the same cannot 
be said for expenditures. Most of them are more or less fixed (for example, payments to 
government employees, public debt servicing or welfare spending), which is why their share 
in GDP _ given a real fall in this aggregate _ can be expected to grow. In practice, in the 
case of social contributions, most of the post-communist countries were not only unable to M. Dąbrowski 
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reduce their commitments in this area, but also had to face new requirements and 
challenges, connected mainly with the effects of unemployment, which had not existed 
officially earlier in Central and East European economies (with the exception of 
Yugoslavia). A rapid growth of the number of pension recipients was a side-effect of the fall 
in employment, and in some countries, of gradual, adverse demographic changes. The 
withdrawal of many general subsidies for goods and services, the fall in registered 
employment and real wages, and the termination of the performance of social functions by 
state enterprises for their employees have caused an increase in the demand for social 
welfare payments. Additional needs in this field have appeared in countries with ongoing 
armed and nationalistic conflicts. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of systemic solutions in this 
field inherited from the previous political-economic system (see Section 4) and/or created 
hastily in the first stage of transformation (often under the pressure of the first democratic 
election campaigns or misleading ideas as to the real financial capabilities of the state) have 
been conducive to the expansion of welfare spending. The biggest problems have resulted 
from overly liberal legislation on counteracting unemployment and from pensions 
legislation. In case of the latter, the most significant sources of excessive expenditures are 
usually linked with: 
•  overly low retirement age and numerous entitlements to early retirement; in most post-
communist countries retirees and pensioners can continue to work without any 
significant restrictions (this is usually a "relict" of the era of labor deficits), 
•  other branch and occupational privileges (the use of preferential coefficients in 
calculation of entitlements, bonuses, etc.), 
•  overly short period of work used in calculating pension entitlements, which may lead 
to manipulations increasing the payments, 
•  unequal principles used in setting pension payments in the agricultural sector, 
•  liberal definitions of entitlements and liberal rules for granting disability pensions, 
•  poorly constructed and calculated principles of valorization and re-valorization of 
payments. 
 
Any attempts to revise the operating principles of pension schemes (even an 
elimination of obviously inequitable privileges, inefficient regulations which are conducive 
to abuses, and entitlements which exceed state financial capabilities) encounter the political 
resistance of large group of pensioners and persons of pre-retirement age (Sachs, 1995b), as 
well as the objection of constitutional courts that consider the aforementioned steps as an 
infringement of the citizens’ rights (Poland and Hungary can serve as examples of the 
latter). Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 13 indicates a rapid growth of the share of welfare spending in GDP in all East 
and Central European countries (excluding Romania and the former Czechoslovakia)
10. The 
level of expenditures of this kind is significantly lower in the countries of the former USSR, 
since most of them experienced strong inflationary depreciation of welfare payments, which 
was not allowed to happen in Central Europe thanks to the well-developed indexation 
systems. Moreover, the labor market situation still exerts lower pressure on the pension 
scheme in the post-Soviet countries. Nevertheless, an upward tendency of welfare 
spending’s share (including pension benefits) in GDP was observed in those countries in 
1994-1995. 
Social programs are not the only reason for secondary fiscal crisis on the expenditure 
side. In various countries, there were also other reasons for increase in budgetary 
obligations. These were: internal and external debt servicing (Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland), 
so-called enterprise and bank restructuring (Hungary, Bulgaria), and sometimes various 
forms of subsidies (Bulgaria). 
The problem to what extent the secondary fiscal crisis is inevitable and how it can be 
avoided was, and to some degree still is, the subject of ongoing disputes. The supporters of 
gradual transformation ("the gradualists") initially blamed the excessive radicalism of 
economic stabilization and liberalization programs (referred to as "overshooting") for the 
secondary fiscal crisis (Nuti and Portes, 1993; Kołodko, 1991). According to them, so-
called shock therapy led to an excessive drop in output and enterprise efficiency, and thus to 
a drop in budgetary revenues as well as excessive unemployment and costs of 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
In Polish discussions, an argument concerning the alleged discrimination against the 
state sector (see Kołodko, 1992) has been put forward many times, though the followers of 
this idea have never presented any convincing evidence. Another argument has been related 
to the allegedly negative impact of privatization on economic activity and budgetary 
revenues (Kowalik, 1993). 
The latter issue has also been a subject of the radical reformers’ concern. In the 
beginning, the state sector seemed to show greater tax discipline than the private sector 
(particularly the thousands of small individual and family firms) and privatized sector. 
Moreover, rapid privatization has been recognized as an unemployment-increasing element 
that leads to the growth of budgetary obligations. It is worth mentioning that there have 
been some interesting discussions on this matter. The main focus of interest in these 
discussions was the optimum pace of enterprise privatization and restructuring and 
transformation as a whole (Roland, 1994; Aghion and Blanchard, 1993). 
The supporters of radical transformation have emphasized the negative influence on 
public finances of such factors as delay in fiscal reforms, overly broad social commitments 
                                              
10 The same situation exists in Slovenia, which is not included in table 13 due to lack of comparable database. 
According to Boris Pleskovic’s data (1995) the pension expenditures amounted to 11% of GDP in 1991, 12.7% of GDP 
in 1992, 13% of GDP in 1993, and 13.7% of GDP in 1994. The expenses of the obligatory Health Insurance Fund 
accounted for 5%, 7.2%, 7.5% and 7.3% of GDP in the respective years.  M. Dąbrowski 
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of the state, the results of the external shock coming from the collapse of the CMEA, and 
the lack of tight wage control in state enterprises (Dąbrowski, 1992; Gomułka, 1993; 
Crombrugghe, 1993; Bratkowski, 1993). 
Currently, from the perspective of several years’ experience in at least a few of the 
countries which went through the first transformation stage, it seems easy to argue for the 
adoption of the following position with regard to this debate: 
First, the example of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia reveals that fiscal 
crises can be avoided. It must be noted that the fiscal policy scenario was different in each 
of the aforementioned countries. Estonia, having a relatively low level of revenues 
generated by the consolidated governmental sector (31-35% of GDP in 1992-1994), has 
been able to impose iron discipline in the field of expenditures, particularly in the area of 
welfare spending. In contrast, Slovenia’s high welfare spending indicator is closer to the 
Hungarian or Polish one than the Estonian one. However, Slovenia has not only been able 
to maintain the earlier ratio of revenues of the broad governmental sector to GDP, but even 
to increase it. To some extent, Slovenia has also benefited from the breakup of the Yugoslav 
federation, having been in the past an important net donor to other federal republics. All 
these reasons also apply in case of the Czech Republic (i.e., maintenance of a relatively high 
level of tax proceeds primarily from enterprises, disciplined welfare spending in comparison 
with Poland, Hungary and even Slovenia, and termination of earlier fiscal transfers to 
Slovakia). 
Second, there is no correlation between the occurrence of the secondary fiscal crisis 
and the application of the radical transformation variant. The countries hardest hit by the 
crisis were Hungary, which in 1990-1992 was the standard example of the gradualist 
strategy (which is reflected in table 8 data that indicate the moderate pace of subsidy 
elimination), and Bulgaria, where frequently changing governments very quickly detoured 
from the radical change path and began to "soften" the conditions for enterprise activity. 
Among the countries that avoided the secondary fiscal crisis are two exceptionally radical 
reformers, namely Estonia and the Czech Republic. 
Third, a heavy drop in officially registered GDP turned out to be in fact unavoidable. 
Generally, however, it was smaller and shorter in the countries that adopted the most radical 
transformation variant (see de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, 1995; Dąbrowski, 1995a; EBRD, 1994; 
Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1995; Aslund, 1994). These were the first countries to return to the 
path of economic growth. 
Fourth, any fears of the negative impact of overly rapid privatization on public 
finances have been not confirmed. The greater tax discipline of the state sector has turned 
out to be a transitory feature. State enterprises have quickly learnt from the private sector 
how to hide turnover and profits (or to transfer them out of the enterprise) and avoid taxes. 
Such practices have occurred on the greatest scale in the countries where the privatization of 
medium and large enterprises has been slow and the state sector has not been subject, from 
the very beginning, to hard budgetary constraints (Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania). 
Fifth, the experience of some Western countries (Sweden, Italy, Finland, France, and 
even the USA) show that the problem of social and pension benefits guaranteed by the state Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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is not exclusively typical for the countries undergoing the transition from plan to market, 
much less of special relevance to the radical transformation path. 
 
7.  Stage of revival and restoration of fiscal potential 
In the case of radical reformers, a phase of transformational downturn in output lasted 
not longer than two (Poland) or three years (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia) from the beginning of the fundamental stabilizing operation. 
Economic growth, if it is based on sound principles (i.e., is not chiefly the result of, for 
example, the development of branches subsidized from the state budget), is connected with 
proportional (or greater) increase in revenues and not necessarily with a fully proportional 
rise in expenditures (the role of fixed expenses, discussed above)
11; thus, it should by itself 
help towards a fiscal balance improvement. In addition, long-term tax reforms (in particular, 
introduction of the VAT and consolidated tax on personal incomes), improvement of the tax 
administration, and adjustment activities of budgetary expenditures (mainly  in the scope of 
social programs) start to bring some positive results. 
Movement from the third stage (secondary fiscal crisis) to the fourth stage (revival and 
fiscal potential restoration) is best exemplified by the Polish case, in which the budget 
deficit has been falling since the second half of 1993. The effects of economic growth (since 
1992) and the aforementioned tax reforms have contributed to an improvement of the 
budget situation. To a lesser degree, this improvement is also due to cuts in welfare 
spending and payments to government employees. These reductions were made in the 
second half of 1991 and in 1992 and 1993, but were of a temporary and mechanical 
character and not linked with deeper systemic reforms in this field. Furthermore, under the 
left-wing coalition (governing since autumn 1993), they were partially reversed. The 
significant reduction of the budget deficit has resulted above all from an increase in the 
share of general government revenues in GDP as well as from the fast growth of GDP. 
Symptoms of the gradual improvement of the budget situation can be observed in 
other countries which are advanced in transformation process, such as Slovenia, Croatia, 
Estonia and the Czech and Slovak Republics. Some of them (as mentioned in Section 6) 
have been able to avoid the secondary fiscal crisis. Slovenia, like Poland, benefits mainly 
from the effects of economic growth and tax reforms. Estonia and the Czech Republic, in 
addition to strengthening their income base, have managed to initiate more ambitious, long-
term oriented reforms of the pension scheme, social policy and social services. In Poland, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic there have only been debates on these issues. 
                                              
11 In practice, it is not always possible to hold the expenditures down during the economic growth and increased 
budgetary receipts. Two political elements play a significant role. Theses are: a willingness of different groups being 
the beneficiaries of the budget to participate in the results of economic growth, and also government difficulty in 
opposing different pressure groups and carrying out unpopular reforms limiting the budgetary commitments. The fiscal 
crisis serves usually as the best argument for breaking the resistance of interest groups when a fortunate situation in the 
field of revenues softens the power of this argument.  M. Dąbrowski 
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The prospects for relative fiscal stability in the group of countries that are already at 
the fourth stage will depend almost entirely on the intensity of the reforms of pension 
schemes, other segments of social policy and basic areas of social services (health service 
and education). The fiscal situation of the countries that do not conduct these reforms 
quickly enough will mainly depend on their ability to maintain the hitherto existing pace of 
growth. An economic slump may easily lead to another serious fiscal crisis.  
 
 
8.  The fiscal situation in slowly reforming countries 
In Section 5 I wrote that not all countries had completed the stage of primary 
stabilization and liberalization, and some of them are still very far from reaching this 
objective. The countries which are still far from achieving this first stage of reform include 
both the countries that have not made any serious attempts to introduce systemic reforms 
and to fight inflation for a long time (Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan), trying to keep remainders of the command system or find a so-
called third way, and the countries that have tried _ sometimes repeatedly _ without success 
to stabilize the economy. Russia and Romania should be included in the second group.
12 
The problems experienced by the countries that over a few successive years have not 
been able to handle the task of initial macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization are 
best exemplified in the cases of three large post-Soviet countries _ Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus.
13 (The Romanian experience has also been similar.) 
Analysis of the aggregated data contained in table 5 generally indicates the relative 
stability of the ratios of expenditures and revenues of general government to GDP
14; on the 
other hand, it also shows the continued high degree of GDP redistribution through the state 
budget and quasi-budget institutions and high budget deficits (except for Belarus in 1991 
and 1994). These data do not give a comprehensive picture of the situation in Belarus and 
Russia due to the fact that the quasi-fiscal deficit has not been included in the statistics. In 
case of the latter country, more accurate information is contained in table 14, although it 
also refers to operations of a fiscal character. Table 14 does not include so-called technical 
credits granted other countries of the ruble zone by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 
1992-1993
15; nor does it include central bank quasi-subsidies for enterprises (see Section 9). 
This last element is also missing in the fiscal statistics of Belarus and, to some extent, 
Ukraine. 
                                              
12 As of the end of 1995, Romania seem to be finally close to achieving permanent stabilization. In 1995, Russia 
also made significant progress in this direction, though it is much too early to evaluate its further prospects.  
13 A more detailed comparative study of the experiences and macroeconomic problems of those three countries 
has been included in Dąbrowski and Antczak (1995).  
14 Except for a rapid jump in expenditures in Ukraine in 1992, and a downturn in both revenues and 
expenditures in Belarus in 1994.  
15 According to various estimations they amounted to around 8.2-8.4% of Russian GDP in 1992, and around 3% 
of GDP in 1993 (Dąbrowski, 1995b). Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Even without data on technical credits and quasi-subsidies of the central bank, the data 
contained in table 14 indicate a more dramatic picture of the fiscal situation in Russia than 
the data presented in table 5. 
Further common characteristics of the three countries under consideration are found in 
table 15, which contains data on official budgetary subsidies for producers (without the 
central bank quasi-subsidies or those connected with centralized imports). Table 16 presents 
data on overall subsidies in Romania in 1989-1993. Given the data contained in tables 15, 
16 and 14, one may draw the conclusion that a basic reason for unsuccessful or delayed 
macroeconomic stabilization within this group of countries was the incomplete internal and 
external liberalization of their economies and the "soft" financing of an unreformed state 
enterprise sector. This policy, usually conducted under the banner of social protection for 
the society (in particular for the poorest classes of society) and of reducing the social costs 
of the transformation process, has in fact imposed on the whole society the huge burden of 
an inflation tax and caused the numerous pathologies which usually accompany high 
inflation.  
Fragmentary data (mainly for Romania and Russia) show that these countries _ 
although they have not yet overcome the primary fiscal crisis _ are already experiencing the 
symptoms of the secondary fiscal crisis, in particular in a form of revenue decline and 
welfare spending growth (Russia in 1994-1995). In the case of Russia, these problems are 
additionally intensified by the defective principles of fiscal federalism. The federal 
government has, for political and administrative reasons, not exercised full control over the 
fiscal policy of the federation’s members, which has resulted in the federal budget’s showing 
a much bigger deficit than that of general government in 1994. 
9. Quasi-fiscal  deficit 
The difficulty of the fiscal situation of the post-communist economies, particularly in 
the first transformation stage, is additionally enhanced by quasi-fiscal expenditures and the 
quasi-fiscal deficit. Generally, two types of quasi-fiscal expenditures can be identified: 
1.  State expenditures (usually to be made in the future) not included in current budgetary 
reporting. The hidden import subsidies in place in Russia until the end of 1993 can 
serve as typical example: the central import by the government of certain products was 
financed with foreign credits, and these products were then sold to domestic firms or 
citizens at prices lower than the import price (until August 1, 1992, this price 
differential was based on a special exchange rate of the ruble). The proceeds from 
these sales were included in current budget revenues (directly or through off-budget 
funds) and credit repayment was treated as a deferred state budget obligation. This is 
not, however, the only example of the creation of future budgetary obligations. 
Another widely used (in almost all post-communist countries) form of quasi-fiscal 
deficit can be found in state guarantees to bank credits which are unlikely to be repaid. 
2.  Central bank quasi-subsidies. These may assume different forms, for example negative 
real interest rates, credits given to particular enterprises at the request of the parliament 
or the government (which quite often have a low probability of being repaid), 
preferential exchange rates for a specified group of clients, state investment credits, M. Dąbrowski 
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public external debt servicing on behalf of the government, and multilateral clearing of 
inter-enterprise arrears. 
The latter type of quasi-subsidies is used more frequently and is usually of greater 
dimensions than deferred obligation of the state budget. This reflects the political 
dependence of central banks on parliaments and governments as well as the frequent lack of 
understanding among monetary authorities of the role they play in the creation of the 
foundations for a market economy. The management of the central bank is often willing to 
continue the practices of the command system, and politicians in post-communist countries 
expect an abundant supply of credit in order to satisfy "justified needs." 
Table 17 presents an effort to estimate central bank quasi-subsidies for a selected 
group of 12 post-communist countries. As the table shows, this type of financing was of 
particular importance in the case of Romania and the post-Soviet countries listed in the 
table, where it sometimes occurred on an enormous scale and fundamentally alters the 
statistics on the real fiscal deficit. The gradual withdrawal or even disappearance of this 
type of financing which accompanies the advancement of market economic reforms and 
economic stabilization constitutes grounds for optimism. 
A full estimate of quasi-fiscal expenses and quasi-fiscal deficits does not seem to be 
entirely possible due to some problems in precisely defining and differentiating these 
phenomena. The question of whether a state guarantee can be automatically classified as a 
component of the quasi-fiscal deficit remains open. Similar difficulties may appear in 
evaluating some open market operations, when for example central bank interventions are 
connected with an intention to increase commercial banks’ demand for government bonds. 
However, in this case, too, as the institutional reforms linked with functioning of the money 
market, public debt market, budget management, and introduction of international 
classification standards and reporting requirements in the field of monetary and fiscal policy 
become more advanced, the picture also becomes more clear. 
10.   Summary and conclusions 
As the analysis presented here shows, fiscal policy has turned out to be one of the most 
difficult components of transformation policy, reflecting the problems that arise in other 
areas of systemic changes. When countries have not been able to realize a consistent policy 
of economic liberalization, eliminate open and hidden subsidies, introduce hard budget 
constraints for state enterprises, inhibit interventionist inclinations, carry out tax reforms 
and improve the efficiency of tax administration and the entire fiscal apparatus, launch 
reforms of social services, etc., they have fallen into fiscal crisis that usually leads to high 
inflation, and in some extreme cases to hyperinflation. The same correlation exists in 
politics: countries that are politically unstable and have weak, inefficient operating or 
simply underdeveloped state structures (as in the case of countries that have recently 
become independent) or are engaged in armed conflicts experience the greatest financial 
difficulties. 
The fiscal situation has changed rapidly as the transformation process unfolds. A 
typical scenario of events starts with a fiscal crisis (at the beginning of transformation Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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process) connected with decomposition of the previously existing political and economic 
system. A radical stabilization and liberalization policy associated, in particular, with the 
removal of different types of subsidies should provide the solution to the aforementioned 
crisis. This stage of fiscal policy, though difficult from a political point of view
16, is quite 
simple from a conceptual and technical point of view and may bring relatively fast results. It 
is not, however, the end of the complicated process of essential fiscal adjustments. Initial 
stabilization success is not permanent since it is usually followed by a secondary fiscal 
crisis, rooted in the transformational decline in output, tax system inefficiency, the 
excessive social obligations of the state, and sometimes in a lack of consistency in 
conducting a tough policy. It is much more difficult to respond to the secondary crisis than 
to the primary one. What is badly needed is a comprehensive reform of the tax system and 
social policy. With regard to the technical and conceptual aspects, these ventures are more 
difficult than simple removal of subsidies and are usually carried out in a more difficult 
political situation than the first package of reforms. Post-transformation growth helps to 
alleviate the secondary crisis. 
This sequence of events is not universal for post-communist economies. A few of 
them have managed to avoid the primary fiscal crisis, at least in its most extreme form, and 
a few have managed to avoid the secondary crisis. This was the case in the countries that 
undertook adjustment activities early or found themselves in an exceptionally favorable 
initial situation. But there is a much larger group of countries in which the stage of 
macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization took a number of years to complete or was 
not completed at all, and for which no final result can yet be foreseen. 
In spite of the views expressed by some economists and politicians several years ago, a 
more gradual pace of reform did not lower the social costs of transformation or prevent the 
secondary fiscal crisis; on the contrary, the populations of the countries conducting slow 
reforms were forced to pay enormous an inflation tax for the benefit of ineffective sectors of 
the economy and to experience a much deeper and longer-lasting drop in GDP, stronger 
differentiation of incomes and wealth, and a number of pathologies including 
"criminalization" of economic life. The typical symptoms of the secondary fiscal crisis have 
overlapped with the primary fiscal crisis very quickly. The scale of necessary adjustment 
activities is much greater and more painful, and prospects for economic recovery are less 
bright than in the countries that have decided on a package of radical reforms from the very 
beginning. 
The transformation process has not been completed yet. This is true of fiscal policy as 
well. Even the countries whose budgets are not in deficit and whose public debt and 
inflation are low (i.e., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia or Croatia) have to face the 
problems of incomplete institutional reforms in the field of social policy and restructuring of 
the government sector and ineffective sectors of industry. In other countries _ even those 
                                              
16 Leszek Balcerowicz emphasises the fact that thanks to the unique political atmosphere after a communist 
regime’s collapse, traditional political barriers are substantially softened for a certain period of time, thus giving a 
group of reformers the possibility to conduct a set of difficult and unpopular reforms. Balcerowicz calls this unique 
political occasion "the period of extraordinary politics," which after a certain period (1-2 years) is replaced by 
"normal politics" (with the bargaining between different interest groups which is characteristic for normal politics). M. Dąbrowski 
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recording a quick pace of economic growth, such as Poland and Albania _ the list of 
challenges is longer. 
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Tables:  
 
Table 1: Money velocity in the selected post-communist  countries (GDP/ 
broad money) 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Romania 2.0  1.7 2.1  3.3 4.8   
Czecho-Slovakia 1.4  1.5 1.4  1.2   
Czech Republic    1.5  1.3 1.3  1.3 
Slovakia   1.4  1.4 1.3  1.6 
Hungary  2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 
Poland  1.2 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Slovenia   3.1  3.5 3.2  3.7 
USSR and Russia  1.6  1.4 1.7  4.4 7.1  8.5 
Albania     1.7 2.0  2.0 
Source: For the Czech Republic , Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Albania - 
MultiQuery Database [1995]; for the USSR and Russia - IEA [1995], tabl. A4; for Romania 
- World Tables [1995]; for Czecho-Slovakia - own calculations based on Klacek and Hrncir 
[1994], tables 1, 2 and 12.  
Note: some differences in global indices for Czecho-Slovakia as well as for the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia for 1991-1992 result from differences in the databases used. 
 
Table 2: Revenues, expenditure and deficit of the 
extended governmental sector in the year proceding the 
beginning of transformation process (in % of GDP) 
Country Year  Revenues  Expenditures  Deficit 
Poland 1989  34.65 39.86 5.21
Hungary 1989  61.16 62.30 1.14
Czecho-Slovakia 1990  61.86 62.60 0.74
USSR 1991  38.00 53.00 15.00
Bulgaria 1989  77.92 79.46 1.54
Romania 1989  50.79 44.07 -6.72
Source: MFW and Central Bank data; own calculations. M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 3: Inflation in selected post-communist economies (CPI - increase in the average 
yearly indicator in %) 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995a 
Poland 251.0  586.0  70.3  43.0  35.3  32.2  29.0 
Czech Republic  2.3  10.8  56.7  11.1  20.8  10.2  9.0 
Slovakia 0.0  10.8  61.2  10.1  23.0  14.0  10.0 
Albania 0.0  0.0  35.5  225.9  85.0  28.0  9.0 
Estonia 6.1  23.1  210.6  1069.0  89.0  48.0  26.0 
Latvia 4.7  10.5  124.4  951.2  109.0  36.0  25.0 
Hungary 17.0  29.0  34.2  22.9  22.5  19.0  29.0 
Slovenia 1306.0  549.7  117.7  201.2  32.0  19.8  13.0 
Lithuania 2.1  8.4  224.7  1020.3  390.2  72.0  36.0 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0  3.0  85.0  854.6  1208.7  280.0  44.0 
Moldova 0.0  4.2  98.0  1276.0  789.0  327.0  20.0 
Romania 1.1  5.1  174.5  210.9  256.0  131.0  34.0 
Russia 2.2  5.6  92.7  1353.0  896.0  220.0  181.0 
Bulgaria 6.0  22.0  333.5  82.0  72.8  89.0  62.0 
Belarus 1.7  4.5  83.5  969.0  1188.0  2200.0  737.0 
Kazakstan 0.0  4.2  91.0  1610.0  1760.0  1980.0  165.0 
Turkmenistan 2.1  4.6  102.5  492.9  3102.0  2400.0  226.0 
Ukraine 2.0  4.0  91.2  1210.0  4735.0  842.0  321.0 
Uzbekistan 0.7  3.1  82.2  645.0  534.0  746.0  273.0 
Armenia 0.0  10.3  100.0  825.0  3732.0  5458.0  185.0 
Azerbaijan 0.0  7.8  105.6  616.0  833.0  1500.0  464.0 
Mongolia 0.0  0.0  208.6  321.0  183.0  145.0  25.0 
Macedonia 1246.0  120.5  229.7  1925.2  248.0  65.0  18.0 
Croatia 2520.5  135.6  249.5  938.2  1516.0  98.0  2.0 
Georgia 0.0  3.3  78.5  913.0  3126.0  18000.0  163.0 
Tajikistan 0.0  4.0  111.6  1157.0  2195.0  452.0  389.0 
a) IMF forecast 
Source: de Melo, Denizer, Gelb [1995], table 3; IMF data Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 4: Monthly inflation rates in countries of the former USSR (in%), July 1994 - 
August 1995 
  Country  7/94 8/94 9/94  10/94  11/94 12/94 1/95 2/95 3/95 4/95 5/95 6/95 7/95 8/95 
Armenia  -1.8 3.7 6.3  11.3  14.7  60.8 3.9 0.7 1.2 7.1 7.8 0.6  -4.6 1.7 
Azerbaijan  11.5  5.9 16.6 33.5 52.0 55.2 27.8 12.5  2.5  5.6  4.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 
Belarus  26.6 53.4 25.5 25.7 40.5 31.3 39.2 33.7 20.0 14.5  3.4  2.5  5.2   
Georgia  18.1  95.0  61.9  16.0  -12.0 4.0 3.0 3.0  -0.3 3.0 1.0  -0.4 4.1   
Kazakstan  25.4  13.3 9.6  20.1  14.2  10.0 8.9 6.7 5.1 3.2 2.7 2.3 2.9   
Kyrgyzstan  2.8 1.7 0.2 5.0 3.2 3.6 7.1 6.8 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.7 0.4   
Latvia  0.9 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.4 3.4 3.3 2.6 1.9 1.4 1.8 0.3   
Lithuania  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.8 3.5 3.8 5.7 3.9 1.4 1.4 2.2 1.0 2.7 0.4 
Moldova  2.2  -0.1 2.5 4.2 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2   
Russia  5.3 4.6 8.0  15.0  14.6  16.4  17.8  11.0 8.9 8.5 7.9 6.7 5.4 4.6 
Tajikistan  4.0 5.9 3.4 6.6 1.6 4.7  13.3  10.9  17.9  20.9  27.9       
Turkmenistan  20.0 38.9 25.6 25.8 15.4 33.5 26.0 55.8 39.9 31.1  5.7       
Ukraine  2.1 2.6 7.3  22.6  72.3  28.4  21.2  18.1  11.4 5.8 4.6 5.2 5.2 4.6 
Uzbekistan  18.2 17.5 10.4 22.3 19.0 10.8 16.9 17.8  7.8 20.1  4.9  1.9  2.0  0.1 
Estonia  2.8 1.0 3.2 1.1 1.6 1.5 3.5 2.9 2.4 1.0 2.6 0.4 1.7 0.6 
Source: data of the IMF and the Institute of Economic Analyses in Moscow M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 5: Revenues, expenditures and budget balance of the extended governmental sector in 
transformation countries (in % of GDP) 
Country Indicator  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994b 
Albania revenues  48.0c 47.0c 31.0c 25.5c 28.0c 27.7b 
 expenditures  57.0c 62.0c 62.0c 48.0c 44.0c 41.0b 
 balance  -9.0c -15.0c -31.0c -22.5c -16.0c -13.3b 
Armenia revenues 52.2c 42.7c 29.1c 21.5c 17.6c 37.0b 
 expenditures  49.8c 36.9c 36.4c 61.5c 66.4c 61.0b 
 balance  +2.4c +5.8c -7.3c -40.0c -48.8c -24.0b 
Azerbaijan revenues  22.3c 26.4c 25.5c 23.4c   36.0b 
 expenditures  24.3c 31.9c 30.5c 27.5c   49.0b 
 balance  -2.0c -5.5c -5.0c -4.1c   -13.0b 
Belarus revenues      47,5e 43,3e 43,6e 36,6b 
 expenditures      43,9e 46,8e 51,9e 38,1b 
 balance      3,6e -3,5e -8,3e -1,5b 
Bulgaria revenues 59.6a 51.6a 42.3a 38.3a 37.4a 38.0b 
 expenditures  61.0a 60.4a 50.9a 45.3a 51.2a 44.1b 
 balance  -1.4a -8.8a -8.6a -5.0a -10.9a -6.1b 
Croatia revenues      14.9d 20.4d 20.1d 27.2d 
 expenditures      19.5d 20.6d 20.7d 27.6d 
 balance      -4.5d -0.2d -0.6d -0.4d 
Czecho-Slovakia revenues  69.5a 61.1a 55.0a 56.4a    
 expenditures  72.3a 61.5a 57.1a 60.1a    
 balance  -2.8a -0.4a -2.1a -3.7a    
Czech Republic  revenues  42.8c 42.4c 35.3c 49.5a 48.5a 51.2b 
 expenditures  42.4c 41.2c 37.0c 47.5a 47.5a 50.7b 
 balance  +0.4c +1.2c -1.7c +2.0a +1.0a +0.5b 
Slovakia revenues      50.9a 48.1a 50.5b 
 expenditures      64.0a 55.1a 53.0b 
 balance      -13.1a -7.0a -2.5b 
Estonia revenues  43.0c 35.7c 38.5c 31.4a 32.5a 35.0b 
 expenditures  42.5c 33.3c 32.5c 31.0a 33.9a 35.0b 
 balance  +0.5c +2.4c +6.0c +0.4a -1.4a 0.0b 
Georgia revenues  31.5c 33.2c 30.0c 10.2c 2.7c 15.0b 
 expenditures  30.6c 32.0c 35.9c    24.0b 
 balance  +0.9c 1.2c -5.9c    -9.0b 
Kazakstan revenues  40.7c 41.4c 35.1c 24.6c 22.3c 19.0b 
 expenditures  39.2c 38.4c 44.1c 31.9c 23.5c 23.5b 
 balance  +1.5c +3.0c -9.0c -7.3c -1.2c -4.5b 
Kyrgyzstan revenues  38.5c 39.5c 35.2c 15.8c 14.2c 24.3b 
 expenditures  36.4c 37.9c 27.3c 33.9c 23.0c 32.7b 
 balance  +2.1c +1.6c +7.9c -18.1c -8.9c -8.4b 
Lithuania revenues  49.8c 45.0c 44.0c 33.3a 25.1a 25.1b 
 expenditures  53.8c 48.8c 36.7c 32.9a 30.4a 30.4b 
 balance  -4.0c -3.9c +7.3c -0.4a -5.3a -5.3b 
 Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 5 - continued. 
Country Indicator  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994b 
Latvia revenues  31.0c 36.6c 26.5c     36.7b 
 expenditures  29.8c 35.8c 21.8c     38.7b 
 balance  +1.2c +0.8c +4.7c     -2.0b 
Macedonia revenues            42.8b 
 expenditures            45.4b 
 balance      -2.6b
Moldova revenues 35.3c 35.2c 26.2c 20.3c 12.4c 17.1b
 expenditures  33.7c 32.4c 26.3c 42.4c 18.1c 25.9b
 balance  +1.6c +2.8c -0.1c -22.1c -5.7c -8.8b
Mongolia revenues  48.6c 50.6c 47.4c 29.9c 36.2c 36.2b
 expenditures  65.3c 64.1c 55.1c 42.7c 53.2c 48.0b
 balance  -16.7c -13.5c -9.7c -12.8c -16.9c -11.8b
Poland revenues  41.4a 42.8a 41.5a 43.9a 45.5a 47.9b
 expenditures  48.9a 39.8a 48.0a 50.7a 48.4a 50.4b
 balance  -7.5a +3.0a -6.5a -6.8a -2.9a -2.5b
Russia revenues    37.6a 35.9a 36.3b
 expenditures    44.4af 41.9af 45.1b
 balance    -6.8a -6.0a -8.8b
Romania revenues 51.0a 39.8a 39.4a 37.6a 30.8a 32.6b
 expenditures  42.8a 38.7a 38.8a 42.2a 31.0a 35.6b
 balance  +8.2a +1.1a +0.6a -4.6a -0.2a -3.0b
Slovenia revenues  48.9c 43.7d 46.6d 49.8d 43.1d
 expenditures  49.3c 41.0d 46.4d 49.4d 44.1d
 balance  -0.4c +2.7d +0.2d +0.4d -1.0d
Tajikistan revenues  40.3c 46.8c 40.7c 32.8c 27.2c 35.4b
 expenditures  38.6c 43.4c 31.9c 69.8c 52.2c 38.1b
 balance  +1.7c +3.4c +8.8c -37.0c -25.0c -2.7b
Turkmenistan revenues  32.4c 42.7c 44.7c 22.5c 13.4c 6.2b
 expenditures  31.2c 41.1c 41.2c 32.6c 17.0c 7.3b
 balance  +1.2c +1.6c +3.5c -10.1c -3.6c -1.1b
Ukraine revenues  26.4c 27.4c 38,3e 44,0e 42,4e 42,3b
 expenditures  25.7c 26.6c 51,9e 73,3e 52,1e 51.4b
 balance  +0.7c +0.8c -13,8e -29,3e -9,7e -9.1b
Uzbekistan revenues  35.2c 45.0c 45.5c 31.9c 41.0c 43.0b
 expenditures  35.8c 45.9c 50.0c 42.1c 43.4c 45.0b
 balance  -0.6c -0.9c -4.5c -10.2c -2.4c -2.0b
Hungary revenues 59.6a 58.0a 56.1a 57.8a 54.1a 52.3b
 expenditures  61.0a 57.5a 58.3a 63.4a 60.5a 58.8b
 balance  -1.4a +0.5a -2.2a -5.6a -6.4a -6.5b
Source: WEO [1994], table 14, and 15 (a); de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb [1995], table 8 (b); PRD 
WB data base (c);  MultiQuery Database [1995] (d); Dąbrowski, and Antczak [1995] (e).  
f - without hidden import subsidies M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 6: Adjustments of revenues and expenditures in 
selected post-communist countries during stabilization-
liberalization stage (in %  of GDP) 
Country  Period of time  Expenditures  Revenues 
Czecho-Slovakia 1989-1991 -15.2  -14.5
Poland 1989-1990  -9.1  +1.4
Hungary 1989-1990  -3.5  -1.6
Bulgaria 1989-1992  -16.2  -21.5
Albania 1990-1992  -14.0  -26.5
Source: See Table 5 
Table 7: Increase (+) or decrease (-) in GDP, 1989-1995 (in % in relation 
to the proceding year and cumulatively for the whole period)  
Country  1989 1990 1991 1992  1993  1994  1995
a 1989-1995 
Poland  +0.2  -11.5  -7.6 +2.6 +3.8 +6.0 +5.5  -2.4 
Czech Republic  +0.4  -3.0  -10.0  -5.0  -0.9 +2.6 +4.0  -12.0 
Slovakia  -1.0  -2.5 -11.2  -7.0  -4.1 +4.8 +5.0  -15.9 
Albania  +9.8  -10.0 -27.7  -9.7 +9.6 +9.4 +7.8  -16.6 
Estonia  +3.3  -8.1 -11.3 -19.3  -6.6 +6.0 +6.0  -28.7 
Latvia  +5.7  -3.4  -8.3 -33.8  -14.8 +1.9 +0.4  -46.0 
Hungary  +0.7  -3.5 -11.9  -4.5  -0.8 +2.0 +1.2  -16.3 
Slovenia  -3.6  -2.6  -9.3  -6.5 +1.3 +5.0 +4.5  -11.5 
Lithuania  +1.1  -6.9 -13.1 -37.7  -24.2 +1.7 +5.3  -58.1 
Kyrgyzstan  +3.8  +3.2  -5.0 -19.1 -16.0 -26.5  +2.0  -48.2 
Moldova +8.8  -1.5  -18.0  -21.3  -8.7  -22.1  +1.5  -50.1 
Romania  -5.8  -5.6 -15.1 -13.5 +1.3 +3.5 +4.5  -28.4 
Russia  +1.5  -3.6  -12.9 -18.5 -15.0 -12.0  -4.3  -50.3 
Bulgaria  -1.9  -9.1 -11.7  -5.6  -2.4 +1.4 +2.3  -24.7 
Bielarus  +7.9  -3.2  -1.9  -9.6 -10.6 -20.2 -13.8  -43.0 
Kazakstan  -0.3  -0.8  -13.0 -14.0 -12.0 -25.0 -11.0  -56.5 
Turkmenistan  -7.0  +1.8  -4.7  -5.3 -10.0 -20.0  -1.0  -39.1 
Ukraine  +4.1  -3.6  -11.9 -17.0 -16.8 -23.7 -10.3  -58.2 
Uzbekistan  +3.7  +1.6  -0.9 -9.5 -2.4 -3.4 -4.0  -14.5 
Armenia  +8.0  -7.2 -11.8 -52.0  -14.1 +5.3 +5.1  -59.7 
Azerbaijan  -6.3  -11.7  -0.7 -26.8 -23.1 -22.0  -8.7  -67.1 
Croatia  -1.5  -8.5 -28.7 -24.8  -3.7 +0.8 +5.0  -50.7 
Georgia  +2.6  -11.1  -20.6 -42.7 -39.2 -35.0  -5.0  -83.4 
Tajikistan  -2.9  -1.6  -8.7 -30.0 -11.1 -21.4 -19.5  -65.7 
Source: IMF, World Bank and PlanEcon databases.  
a) ForecastFiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 8: Expenditures of the extended governmental sector for subsidies (in % of GDP 
) in the countries conducting a radical variant of stabilization. 
Country  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993  Changes 
Czecho-Slovakia  25.0  16.2 7.7 5.0 -  -20.0a 
Poland  12.9 7.3 5.1 3.3 2.2  -10.7b 
Hungary  12.1 9.6 8.0 5.8 4.8  -7.3b 
Bulgaria  15.5  14.9 4.2 1.8 4.8  -13.7a 
Albania 8.3  15.7  20.3  8.2 2.2  -18.1c 
Explanation: a - for 1989-1992; b - for 1989-1993; c - for 1991-1993 
Source: WEO [1994]; see also table 15 
Table 9: Investment expenditures of the extended governmental 
sector (in% of GDP) in the countries conducting a radical variant 
of stabilization. 
Country  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Czecho-Slovakia 8.5  6.9  8.4  11.3 - 
Poland  3.3 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.5 
Hungary  6.6 4.7 6.2 8.1 6.2 
Bulgaria  5.5 3.1 2.0 2.8 1.9 
Albania  29.3  18.8 6.1 4.3 7.7 
Source: See table 8 M. Dąbrowski 
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Source: de Melo, Denizer, Gelb [1995], table 8 Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 11: Proceeds from tax on enterprise profits (in %  of GDP), 1989-1994 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Bulgaria 23.2  17.9 17.4  8.3 5.6   
Czecho-Slovakia 11.0  12.2 13.7  11.7    
Czech Republic      11.1 7.5   
Slovakia     10.3 6.5   
Estonia     5.3 4.0   
Hungary 8.1  7.6 5.7  2.6 2.2   
Lithuania     6.3 4.7   
Poland 9.7  14.0 6.1  4.6 5.3   
Romania   7.3 5.1  5.3 3.5   
Armenia     8.2 4.6   
Mongolia 21.3  19.5 13.1  11.7 13.0   
Slovenia   0.6  0.6 0.0  0.8 
Croatia   0.1  0.5 0.5  0.7 
Albania     0.5 0.7  2.2 
Source: WEO [1994], table 14; MultiQuery Database [1995]; IMF data 
Table 12: Turnover tax, VAT and excise proceeds (in % of GDP), 1989-1994 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Bulgaria 11.2  9.0 7.4  6.1 7.6   
Czecho-Slovakia 17.7  18.0 12.6  12.8    
Czech Republic      11.5 12.0   
Slovakia     13.4 13.8   
Estonia        8.0   9.2   
Hungary 16.1  13.8 13.9  13.6 14.3   
Lithuania      11.3   7.2   
Poland    8.8    6.3   7.4    9.0 10.6   
Romania  18.8  11.8   8.3    7.0   7.4   
Mongolia   7.2 8.4  7.4 5.0   
Slovenia   10.2  10.7 11.7  11.7 
Croatia      7.8  11.6 13.5  17.5 
Albania        7.5   7.9    5.8 
Source: WEO [1994], table 14; MultiQuery Database [1995] M. Dąbrowski 
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Table 13: Share of welfare spending in GDP (in %), 1989-1993 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Albania     7.1    8.6  12.0  10.8  12.7 
Bulgaria 10.4  12.0  14.2  14.1  15.8 
Czecho-Slovakia 13.6  13.6  16.1  16.4   
Czech Republic        14.0  13.5 
Estonia          7.6    8.8 
Lithuania       19.2  14.3 
Slovakia       18.8  16.7 
Hungary 14.4  14.9  18.1  18.9  18.2 
Poland 11.2  10.6  17.3  19.9  20.4 
Romania    9.5  10.6  10.1    9.1    8.9 
Russia          6.1    6.7 
Source: WEO [1994]; see also table 15.  
 
Table 14: Data on fiscal policy in Russia, 1991-1994 
(in % of GDP) 
Item  1991 r.  1992 r.  1993 r.  1994 r. 
Federation Budget 
Revenues 23,6  16,6  13,7 11,0
Expenditures 22,8  27,4  20,3 21,9
Balance -0,8  -10,7  -6,7 -10,9
Regional Budgets 
Revenues ...  17,6  15,7 17,5
Expenditures ...  17,0  16,0 17,0
Balance ...  0,6  -0,3 0,5
Off-budget funds balance 
 -2,2  2,5  0,6 0,5
Off-budget import subsidies 
 -4,2  -11,9  -2,1 ...
Extended governmental sector balance 
Subsidies ...  8,9  8,6 7,5
Balance -5,7  -18,8  -7,6 -9,9
Source: IMF data Fiscal Crisis in the Transformation Period... 
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Table 15: Total subsidies for  producers in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, in % of GDP ( 1992-
1994) 
Country  1992 r.  1993 r.  1994 r. 
Belarus 11,0  12,4 7,1
Russia 8,9  8,6 7,5
Ukraine 9,1  5,5 9,1a
a - January - July 
Source: IMF data 
Table 16: Total subsidies in Romania, 1989-1993 






Source: WEO [1994], table 15 
Table 17: Fiscal deficit, central bank quasi-fiscal expenditures and total deficit 
for selected post-communist economies  (in % of GDP), 1992-1994 
Country  Fiscal deficit  Quasi-fiscal  
expenditures  
Total deficit 
  1992 1993 1994 1992  1993  1994  1992 1993 1994 
Poland  6.8 2.9 2.9 0.0  0.0  0.0  6.8 2.9 2.9 
Hungary  5.7 7.0 6.5 0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7 7.0 6.5 
Czech Republic  0.5  -0.6  -0.5 0.3  0.8  0.1  0.8  0.2  -0.4 
Slovakia  13.1 7.6 2.5 0.3  1.7  0.0  13.4 9.3 2.5 
Bulgaria  5.0 11.1  6.1 1.3 0.8 0.7 6.3 11.9  6.8 
Estonia  -0.5 1.4 0.0   0.2  0.3   1.6 0.3 
Romania  5.5 1.0 3.0 5.9  3.9  0.0  11.4 4.9 3.0 
Russia  3.4 8.1 8.8 11.3  1.7  0.0  14.7 9.8 8.8 
Kazakstan 7.3  1.2  4.5 32.7    2.6  40.0    7.1 
Bielarus 6.4  9.4  1.5 26.5  9.3  3.4  32.9  18.7  4.9 
Turkmenistan 10.1  3.6  1.1 12.5  21.2  6.4  22.6  24.8  7.5 
Uzbekistan 10.2  8.4  2.0 13.1  18.5  19.0  23.3  26.9  21.0 
Source: de Melo, Denizer, Gelb [1995], table 9 
 